Unpredictable Security – the pros and cons

The TSA Blog and Blogger Bob

The TSA has been under fire for just about as long as they’ve existed. It’s nothing new to read that the TSA is being blamed for this and that, and that they’ve made some mistake or other. Lately, it’s been their blog that’s in focus, commenters accusing the editor, “Blogger Bob” and the “TSA Blog Team” of censoring comments that portray the TSA in any other way than that sanctioned by the administration.

Be that as it may, the TSA blog has helped in making the agency’s reasoning and sometimes confusing set of rules and regulations more transparent, and more accessible to the traveling public. There’s no doubt about it. What there should also be no doubt about is that being the TSA blogger is a very ungrateful job, but a necessary one, judging from the response the blog has had, both positive and negative.

One of the questions that the blog does pose, however, is how it fits in with the TSA’s intention of being “unpredictable” as a part of their “layered approach” to airport security, and transportation security in general. Time after time, “Blogger Bob” and his team point out facts, figures and regulations that has never changed, or has changed little, and they also point out facts, figures and procedures that the TSA currently use in order to secure the traveling public. While this is a good thing for the traveling public, it does seem that on some level, it undermines the TSA’s resolve to keep their checkpoints unpredictable. That is not the main problem when it comes to having that policy, however.

TSA, the traveling public and unpredictable security

Being unpredictable is a good thing when it comes to security. Guards, police, and even military personnel is routinely taught to think in an “anti-routine” manner, to avoid making rounds, for example, in a set time interval. That’s a simple example, but it shows the basics of “anti-routine” thinking – i.e. don’t do anything in such a way that someone can predict your actions, and make use of it for their own purpose.

Making the TSA unpredictable is a good proposition, from a security point of view. Making sure that the terrorist, or would’be such, can’t figure out the weak points (of which there are many) by moving them around, so to speak, is essentially a good idea.

There’s a “but” hidden here, however – maybe you guessed there would be. It’s this: “anti-routine” is one thing when it comes to a single guard, a team of guards, a shift of police officers walking a beat or other small groups of security personnel working on their own. It’s a whole different ball game when it comes to dealing with millions upon millions of traveling “civilians”, most of them with limited or no knowledge about the how and why behind security systems and procedures.

The fact is that while many people think they know something about security, the reality is that their knowledge hardly matches even the TSO’s – you know, the one doing the screening.

That the general public doesn’t know the exact reasoning behind every little security procedure isn’t necessarily a problem, but when the system as a whole becomes a perceived problem, a “hassle” and unintelligible to the individuals who are forced to make their way through the tangle, then you’re on a dangerous track. Security systems should work against the threat, and for the legitimate traveler, employee, citizen, etc. That’s where the “anti-routine” system fails when it comes to mass transit.

Focusing on the threat

Up and until now, the TSA, and airport security agencies in other countries as well have seen and treated the whole mass of traveling individuals as potential threats. This is also where the system is currently failing. Checkpoint security is in general a good idea, making sure that areas beyond them are safe and threat free, if the checks are done correctly, and with a cooperating “body of travelers” or persons wishing to enter the restricted area. Treating each and every one of them as a potential threat might, on the surface, look like a good idea, but in the end, that will create an atmosphere of “us and them”, making threats where none existed before.

Focusing on the threat has been the main method of El Al, for example, profiling (no, not racial profiling) each and every passenger with a specialized interview method that is designed to easily let the “innocent” through, while stumping and revealing the plotters and planners and, well, terrorists that are trying to make their way on board an aircraft. This method was proven as a success in the case of (amongst numerous others) the Hindawi Affair, where a white female was unknowingly carrying a bomb onto a plane. Even though she didn’t know of the bomb, the plot was still thwarted thanks to the profilers and their system.

While it’s been well established that the Israeli system is not transferable to for example the US, certain basic ideas and methods would be a positive addition to the way airport security is done today. One of these is focusing on the threat, which is something that has been diluted into “focusing on everyone” in the TSA procedures of today.

The Israeli interview technique is not unknown, and it’s consistent – passengers know what to expect, but still the would-be terrorist is caught by it. This should also send a signal to the TSA and other airport security operators that predictability can actually be your friend. The problem is adapting it to a much higher capacity need than for example Ben Gurion has.

Predictability can be your friend

Having the traveling public understand your methods and being able to predict what they have to go through (not necessarily what you’re going to do, there’s a difference) in order to achieve what they want, i.e. gain access fot their flight, the restricted area etc. will create an atmosphere of cooperation, instead of the “us vs them” atmosphere that exists today.

If everyone knows what to expect, and what they have to do in order to get where they want to go, then anyone breaking the pattern of cooperation will easily be identified as the threat, and even the general public will support any sanctions against that individual or group.

Efficiency will go up, since people will be prepared, and threats are more likely to be discovered, since they will break the pattern that “the masses” will establish.

The conclusion is that “anti-routine” works for small groups, independent of “outsiders”, but when it comes to larger groups of people dependent on security functions, predictability will establish a pattern of cooperation. When the pattern is broken, the threat reveals itself and can be dealt with.