“Security Theatre” – what seems to be the officer, problem?

Taking a look at Bruce Schneier’s blog today, he’s posted one of the famous “one-line-and-big-quote” thingies of his again, this time falling on the security theatre practice once more. It’s apparently become a habit, or some sort of monkey on his back, to talk down the things he doesn’t really understand.

Now, let me say this, Bruce is probably very good at what he is actually qualified for – IT security, cryptography, and all that jazz. I wouldn’t think of talking about it unless I absolutely had to, because I don’t have training in those things, just like Bruce apparently has no understanding of many physical security concepts.

Talking today (or, rather, the post was from yesterday) about the recent shooting of a pastor, Schneier urges more security for hotels and churches, but belittles as is the standard for him, the concept of security checkpoints and personell. For those who may have missed it;

“First Baptist Church in Maryville, Illinois, had a security plan in place when a gunman walked into services Sunday morning and killed Pastor Fred Winters, said Tim Lawson, another pastor at the church.”

According to some papers, the pastor tried to shield himself from the bullets with a Bible, and some viewers of a video that exists have remarked that the gunman’s Glock actually jams before he’s managed to empty the first of the 4 clips he had brought to the church, claiming that would only happen with divine intervention… Anyway, there is no information to be found as to what the church’s security plans actually consisted of, and how elaborate they were. That means there’s no way to know if the security plans failed or were unable to lay out an SOP for these kinds of events.

Bruce remarks;
“Sounds like those plans didn’t make much of a difference. “

Like I said, we have no way of knowing.

Further;
“And does anyone really believe that security checkpoints at hotel entrances will make any difference at all?”

Again, it’s hard – not impossible, but hard – to measure the number of incidents of a certain kind that hasn’t happened, so Schneier really can’t bring up that point when it comes to security checkpoints and security theatre concepts. Also, I don’t really see any suggestions as to what should have been done to increase security, like he calls for, if we look away from the checkpoint configuration, and being such an expert, why not share of the infinite wisdom and enlighten us to what should be done?

As usual; a whole lot of hot air. It’s coming to the point where only the “Friday Squid” postings are worth reading.